This is because the joint environment is a fluid and dynamic battlespace where an inability to make simple decisions such as changes to a flight plan would prove catastrophic in actual combat. While integration into the joint fight remains a challenge for the Chinese PLAAF, the ability to conduct air refueling remains another limitation in the quest for power projection.
The Chinese are attempting to overcome this problem in a variety of ways. One of these ways is by building up airbases on islands in the South China Sea. Andrew S. Air refueling remains one of the cornerstones of strategic air support. Photo by Staff Sgt. Jordan Castelan, U. Air Force. A country that is trying to develop an air component will often acquire various assets through purchase, yet this places the PLAAF in a perplexing situation. A starting point for examination is military spending.
While the Chinese are at risk relying on outside procurement, some believe that it is an obstacle that can easily be overcome. This remains a counterpoint to the challenge of relying heavily on borrowed or stolen technology and does not validate the ability of a country to mass produce aircraft during a conflict.
The first indicator would be a successful air campaign launched against a formidable air defense. More simply, how would it conduct an air campaign?
The degree of air control between opposing forces is inversely proportional to one another, with increasing air control by one force corresponding to decreasing air control by the other. For those air forces that are unable to contest for air superiority or even air parity, a course of action would be air denial ; that is, maintaining a level of operations that, although it concedes air superiority to the other side, prevents it from achieving air supremacy.
Air power has become an increasingly powerful element of military campaigns ; military planners view having at least an environment of air superiority as a necessity. Air supremacy allows greatly increased bombing efforts as well as tactical air support for ground forces.
In addition, paratroop assaults, airdrops , and simple cargo plane transfers can move ground forces and supplies. Periods of German air superiority included the so-called Fokker Scourge of late , early and Bloody April April The defeat suffered by Austria-Hungary in that battle caused the dissolution of their empire.
In , Italian aerial warfare theorist Giulio Douhet published The Command of the Air which posited that future wars would be decided in the skies. At the time, mainstream military theory did not see air power as a war winning weapon. Douhet's idea that air power could be a decisive force and be used to avoid the long and costly war of attrition of World War I was influential, even if later events proved him wrong in many details. In The War of 19, Douhet theorized that a future war between Germany and France would be settled in a matter of days as the winner would be the one to gain air supremacy and destroy a few enemy cities with aerial bombs the targets would be announced ahead of time and all of the population evacuated.
The population would be so terrorized by this that they would pressure their government into immediate surrender. At the beginning of World War II , Douhet's ideas were dismissed by some but as the war continued, it became apparent that his theories on the importance of aircraft were supported by events.
The Royal Air Force tested the ability of air supremacy in isolation from other forms of warfare during their first independent action in Waziristan in The operation that would later come to be known as Pink's War , after Wing Commander Richard Pink in charge of the operation, used only air warfare in a combination of air attack and 'air blockade' over fifty-four days to force militant tribes to surrender.
As successful as the campaign was in bringing the tribes to surrender, with only two deaths for the RAF, not all were entirely convinced of its use in isolation; Commander-in-Chief, India General Sir Claud Jacob stated: "Satisfactory though the results of these operations have been, I am of opinion that a combination of land and air action would have brought about the desired result in a shorter space of time, and next time action has to be taken, I trust that it will be possible to employ the two forces in combination.
American general Billy Mitchell was another influential air power theorist of the interwar period. After World War I, Mitchell arranged live fire tests which proved that aircraft could sink battleships the largest and most heavily armed class of warships.
His ideas were not popular, but would prove prescient. At the beginning of World War II , the main combatants took different views on the importance of air power.
Adolf Hitler saw it as only a helpful tool to support the Heer , the German army an approach dubbed "flying artillery ". The Allied powers , however, saw it as being a more important part of warfare, specifically long-range strategic bombing which they thought could cripple Germany's industrial centers. Investment in continual modernization to pursue air supremacy ultimately benefits the joint force through swift, decided airpower projection that will continue to make airpower an asymmetric advantage now and in the future.
Once the command of the air is obtained by one of the contended armies, the war must become a conflict between a seeing host and one that is blind. Pako, great stuff.
As I read this, I wanted you to wrap it up by taking it to the next level. What does sustaining air superiority look like in the future? Like Like.
Maestro, thanks for the comments. Unfortunately I ran out of space in this article to pull on that thread. In my humble view ensuring future air superiority will require a traditional high-low mix using historically nontraditional resources. Pako, thanks for this. Great stuff. I was an Intel Officer Weapons School student, but also a drop-out big regret!
I suppose the alternative is re-starting the F You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email. You must be logged in to post a comment. Share this: Click to email this to a friend Opens in new window Click to print Opens in new window Click to share on Facebook Opens in new window Click to share on Twitter Opens in new window Click to share on Pinterest Opens in new window.
At the current rate, by the time the last FAs are completed, the oldest Joint Strike Fighters will be nearing the end of their service life or lethality. However, the Air Force should already be procuring 60 to 80 FAs and ramping up to per year, per its original plan.
The latest increase in defense spending is only a short two-year deal and offers no guarantee for the future. By capitalizing on economies of scale and savings through multiyear procurement contracts, we can deliver even greater affordability and lethality to our airmen and to our allies. Parties on both sides of the negotiation table could save the most money for taxpayers using a block buy and then securing a multiyear contract. Air superiority 10 years from now must deal simultaneously with air, space and cyberspace domains.
Airmen must exploit information, knowledge and decision capabilities, and the Air Force needs to rapidly develop the tools for all three domains. Anything less is unfair to our airmen, our ground war fighters and our taxpayers. This week marks the 65th year since U. At the present pace of investment, it is unlikely that our ground forces will be as lucky for the next 65 years. Keith Zuegel is a retired U. By Col.
Keith Zuegel ret. Apr 18,
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